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Abstract 
 While the trend in contemporary discussions of environmental ethics is often to dispense 
with traditional anthropocentric conceptions of morality in favor of more biologically and 
ecologically inclusive perspectives, I will argue that Natural Law Theory and Virtue Ethics, both 
integral components of the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, provide the groundwork for an 
ecologically and zoologically responsible ethic. Thus, utilizing the core of Aquinas’s ethical 
system, I will attempt to construct a robust moral framework that is Thomistic in every important 
sense while at the same time satisfies the sufficiency conditions for a successful environmental 
code of conduct.  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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Anthropomorphism and Environmental Ethics 
 Many contemporary environmental ethicists have abandoned traditional anthropocentric 
approaches to morality largely due to the perceived negative impacts such systems have had on 
society’s attitude toward the environment, animals, and the planet as a whole.  It is widely 1
believed that Christian human exceptionalism, the idea that God has placed man over and above 
all other creatures, is one of the main contributing factors to our current environmental crisis.  2
Because nearly every major metaethic in the history of western philosophy (virtue ethics, 
Kantian ethics, natural law, Mill’s utilitarianism, etc.) has presupposed anthropomorphism and 
human exceptionalism, many environmental ethicists endeavor to build a wholly new metaethic 
that seeks establish ethical principles solely on the basis of their contribution to the 
environmental project.   3
 The renown medieval Christian philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas is 
sometimes specifically cited as one of the principle reasons why the western world has a 
relatively apathetic attitude toward many environmental and zoological issues. Aquinas’s view of 
animals as automatons and idea that all of creation is designed to serve mankind lead many to 
believe that a Thomistic metaethic is essentially and necessarily inadequate when it comes to 
addressing contemporary environmental issues. Given these concerns, I have three primary goals 
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 Holmes Rolston III, Philosophy gone Wild, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 20.3
in writing this paper: first, I shall explore the facets of Aquinas’s thought that have the most 
significant ramifications for environmental ethics and zoological issues; second, I shall examine 
why and how Aquinas arrives at his problematic conclusions regarding animals and the 
environment; and finally, I shall endeavor to show how one can utilize the core principles of 
Aquinas’s metaethics in order to construct a moral system that is both environmentally and 
zoologically responsible, culminating in an Thomistic environmental ethic derivative of natural 
law theory, virtue ethics, and Aquinas’s nuanced theory of value. 
 Before proceeding further, it is necessary to explain exactly what environmental ethicists 
are looking for when evaluating moral systems. What are the sufficiency conditions of a 
responsible and robust environmental ethic? While most have some conceptual notion of what 
this should look like, explicitly delineating some criteria for sufficiency will allow us to 
adjudicate our success in finding a suitable Thomistic environmental ethic. In his book 
Character and Environment, ethicist Ronald L. Sandler develops such sufficiency conditions 
based on what most all environmental ethicists believe to be intuitively necessary for a 
successful environmental ethic. While these criteria could potentially be expanded upon, 
intuitively, they seem to a good beginning point. According to Sandler, any sufficient 
environmental ethic must satisfy the following criteria:  4
 (1) A satisfactory environmental ethic must provide a basis for reliable, sustained, and 
justified critiques of environmentally unsustainable practices, policies, and lifestyles. Clearly, 
whatever ethical system we adopt should not permit undue or excessive strain on our 
environment. This point is perhaps the least controversial of the three, as even the most 
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anthropocentric systems typically require sustainable practices for the good of mankind. Not 
only does overuse of natural resources and unsustainable lifestyles pose a threat to ecosystems 
and habitats, but also to the long-term survival needs of the human race. 
 (2) It must provide action and policy guidance in concrete situations involving individual 
or communal interactions or relationships with the natural environment. No moral system, no 
matter how clever or elegant, is of any use if it is not practical and determinate. A robust 
environmental ethic ought to be able to offer concrete decision making procedures that have the 
potential to influence policy and impact ordinary lifestyle choices. 
 (3) It must provide arguments, reasons, or justifications that that are efficacious in 
moving people to adopt the policies or perform the actions recommended.  A successful 5
environmental ethic should be epistemically compelling, cohering with our other beliefs about 
reality in a fashion that compels us toward desirable behaviors. This can only be accomplished if 
the core principle(s) of our moral system produce results that square with our moral intuitions 
and ordinary beliefs about the world.  
 Given these criteria, it will likely become clear why Aquinas’s moral thinking is seen as 
counterproductive to the environmental movement. As I will demonstrate in the following 
chapter, it appears that Aquinas does not believe that there is anything inherently wrong with 
animal cruelty. His belief that the sole purpose of creation is to serve mankind also has troubling 
implications regarding our obligations to the natural world. Given these difficulties, one may 
wonder why anyone would endeavor to create an environmentally responsible Thomistic ethic or 
what would be included in such a system after removing the troubling components. First, I will 
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argue that one of the primary problems with the recent environmental ethics movement is its total 
rejection of traditional anthropomorphic systems, many of which have proven to be intuitively 
and philosophically satisfying for thousands of years. As I hope to show with this paper, one 
need not entirely reject anthropomorphism in order to create obligations towards animals and the 
environment that are sufficiently responsible. The rejection of these systems, particularly the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic system, involves not only a rejection of the practical implications that 
some find unsettling, but also the rejection of a robust and compelling metaphysic that has 
contributed invaluable insights to philosophy and academia as a whole. If the sole motivation for 
rejecting such notions is because of their implications for environmental philosophy, it may be 
preferable to only amend (or simply reinterpret) the axioms of a time-tested metaethic. 
Identity Conditions for a Thomistic Ethic 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the main project of this essay is to develop an 
environmentally responsible Thomistic ethic despite the seemingly troubling ideas Thomas 
himself  held regarding animals and the environment. Thus, it is clear that we will be deviating 
from some of the conclusions that Thomas drew on these matters. This being said, it is important 
to establish some identity conditions for a genuinely “Thomistic” ethic, lest our final product fail 
to resemble his thinking in any recognizable form. Here, then, are the features I believe to be 
fundamental to Aquinas’s metaethic:  6
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 This list is not necessarily exhaustive, but should be suffice to outline the relevant essential features of Thomas’s 6
thought. There may be some features that some would take to be essential to Thomism that are not listed here 
because they are not directly relevant (God’s simplicity, for example).
 Anthropocentrism. Human excellence is an inescapable axiom of Aquinas’s thought.  His 7
anthropocentric theory of personhood is so intimately tied to his metaphysics that it is neither 
possible nor desirable to reject it. For our purposes, we will take “anthropocentrism” simply to 
be the idea that humans are the most significant species on the planet and that morality is 
primarily concerned with their well being. While the term itself has different connotations 
depending on the context in which it is used, this definition is broad enough to encompass all of 
its flavors.   8
 A perfectionist Theory of Value. Aquinas believes that things are good insofar as they 
perfect their own nature, which in turn will lead to a fulfillment of their teleology. A thing acting 
in accordance with its purpose seems to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for a thing 
begin called good on Aquinas’s conception. Given Aquinas’s anthropocentrism, Mark Timmons 
summarizes Aquinas’s theory of value as, “Some state of affairs S is intrinsically good if and 
only if (and because) the realization of S is part of what perfects human nature.”  This will be our 9
working definition of “intrinsic value” for the remainder of this essay, as it comports well with 
Aquinas’s intentions on my estimation. 
 A Virtue-Oriented Approach rooted in Natural Law. Given the perfectionist theory of 
value explicated above, Aquinas’s conception of virtue is necessarily teleological. A person acts 
virtuously when he performs actions that work toward the perfection of his nature, and acts 
wrongly when his actions frustrate the perfection of his nature. We shall see later that because 
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man’s nature is that of a rational animal, mankind has an obligation to act in accordance with 
reason. This idea will be explored more deeply in the coming chapters. 
 A commitment to Christian Theism. Aquinas makes no apology for the fact that his moral 
system is not only strictly theistic, but exclusively Christian. Most of the primary sources 
consulted for outlining his moral theory here are just as much theological as they are 
philosophical. Thus, because our goal here to to explicate a Thomistic environmental ethic, no 
attempt will be made here to reconcile these ideas with philosophical naturalism. 
 An acceptance of Aristotelian Metaphysics. Finally, our ethical theory must not contradict 
any major tenet of Aristotelian metaphysics or epistemology. Implicit in our discussion will be an 
acceptance of hylomorphic dualism and Aristotelian causality and a rejection of Platonic forms, 
innate ideas, and cartesian dualism. This will be exceedingly important as we move forward, as 
much of the supposed guilt attributed to Christianity regarding our environmental crisis can be 
traced back to substance dualism rather than Christianity proper.  
 These five aspects of Aquinas’s moral theory seem to exhaust the essential components of 
a Thomistic ethic. There may be other accidental components that nuance his position, but I 
believe that most will agree that any ethic meeting the above criteria is genuinely Thomistic. We 
are now in a position to analyze the troubling areas of Aquinas’s moral thinking, which will be 
the focus of the next chapter.  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CHAPTER TWO:  THREE REASONS WHY ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICISTS  
HAVE ABANDONED THOMAS 
Reason One: Aristotelian Roots 
 Aristotle’s influence on Aquinas’s thinking is undeniable. Many of Thomas’s overly 
anthropocentric concepts that trouble environmental ethicists clearly have their root in Aristotle. 
Perhaps the most significant example of this is Aristotle’s hierarchy of subserviency. Aristotle 
held that there exists a hierarchy of reasoning ability, with each being existing for the purpose of 
the being immediately above it in the hierarchy . For example, plants exist for the use of 10
animals, animals exist for the use of man, etc. Because man is is the penultimate being on 
Aristotle’s conception, he concludes that “all animals [exist] for the sake of man.”  We find in 11
Aristotle the first notions of the supremacy of mankind, with all of creation serving the chief end 
of our consumption and enjoyment.  
 Peter Singer argues that Aristotle’s notion of a hierarchy of subserviency leads to 
obviously immoral conclusions not only by the standards set by those in the animal liberation 
movement, but nearly everyone in the contemporary western world. While his primary criticism 
of Aristotle stems from the deleterious effects that his thinking has contributed to how society 
views and treats animals, Singer is equally concerned by how this same concept was used to 
justify slavery.  Because Aristotle’s hierarchy is based on rationality, Aristotle indicates that the 12
less rational human populations (for Aristotle, the surrounding barbarian tribes) exist for the sake 
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of the more rational ones (Greeks), rendering slavery not only perfectly natural, but also just.  13
Because slavery is clearly unjust, Singer indicates that we are justified in believing that 
Aristotle’s hierarchy is an incorrect (or perhaps unhelpful) moral principle.  
Reason Two: Thomas’s Remarks on Animals 
 “Saint Thomas has ushered in centuries of neglect, and even callousness towards, the 
non-human world,” writes Andrew Linzey and Ara Barsam.  Their sentiments are not 14
uncommon; throughout my research, various parties have consistently blamed Thomas Aquinas 
as one one the chief causes of our current environmental crisis and widespread mistreatment of 
animals.  Though I will later argue that his metaethic and ontology lend themselves to 15
responsible care of the non-human world, it cannot be denied that Aquinas himself had a rather 
low view of animals. Aquinas’s ideas about non-human creatures demonstrates an inconsistency 
in how he applies his own metaphysic to the value and treatment of animals. Saint Thomas’s 
personal views on the treatment of animals need not indicate a deficiency in his metaethic, but 
rather a mere misapplication of otherwise sufficiently compelling moral principles.  
 To begin, there are a few places in Thomas’s writings where he indicates that animals 
have no value outside of their instrumental use to humans. Referencing Augustine, Aquinas 
writes, “According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for 
themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), ‘by a most just ordinance 
of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use.’”  Here, it becomes clear 16
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that Aquinas draws heavily from Augustine’s arguments against the intrinsic value of non-human 
animals. Augustine is even more pointed than Aquinas in his insistence that animals have only 
intrinsic value, stating that to refrain from killing animals because of moral reasons is “the height 
of superstition.”  He believes this principle to be evident in Scripture, citing Mark 5 where Jesus 17
commands a multitude of demons to possess pigs, running them off of a cliff and eventually 
drowning.  18
 Similarly, Aquinas states that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with torturing animals. 
Because all animals exist for man’s sake, the only reason one is not permitted to torture a non-
human animal is because it could inadvertently bring about some injury to his fellow man. 
Aquinas writes the following regarding alleged scriptural prohibitions regarding animal cruelty: 
Indeed, if any statements are found in Sacred Scripture prohibiting the commission of an 
act of cruelty against brute animals, for instance, that one should not kill a bird 
accompanied by her young (Deut. 22:6), this is said either to turn the mind of man away 
from cruelty which might be used on other men, lest a person through practicing cruelty 
on brutes might go on to do the same to men; or because an injurious act committed on 
animals may lead to a temporal loss for some man, either for the agent or for another 
man; or there may be another interpretation of the text, as the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:9) 
explains it, in terms of “not muzzling the ox that treads the corn” (Deut. 25:4).  19
The above passage is interesting for our purposes for at least two reasons; first, it seems to be a 
tacit admission that Scripture, at least prima facie, prohibits some instances of animal cruelty. At 
first glance, one might think that these prohibitions are made out of compassion, and Aquinas 
would likely partially agree with this; instead of seeing them as directing compassion toward the 
animals themselves, however, Aquinas sees these prohibitions as a mandate to exercise 
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compassion as a virtue. The successful adherence to these prohibitions are not for the sake of the 
animals themselves, but purely for the betterment of the individual man. This virtue-oriented 
approach is of course the central component of Aquinas’s ethic. 
 Soon after his analysis of scriptural prohibitions against animal cruelty, Aquinas gives his 
reasons for stating that it is an error to believe that it is a sin to kill brute animals. He writes that, 
“…animals are ordered to man’s use in the natural course of things, according to divine 
providence. Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing them or by 
employing them in any other way.”  This squares well with Aquinas’s teleological view of 20
nature and the belief that every being possesses its own final causality. Aquinas indicates that we 
know the chief end of animals not only through natural means (by observations of what they are 
good for), but also through special revelation such as Genesis 3:9.  Thomas’s insistence that 21
animals exist for man’s use is likely also derivative from Aristotle’s hierarchy of subserviency. 
 Clearly, animal value is entirely reduced to instrumental value for Aquinas. It is these 
kinds of notions that have caused environmental ethicists the abandon the Thomistic position in 
favor of non-anthropocentric systems. As we shall see in the coming sections, while these 
specific pronouncements may seem to be insurmountable obstacles in formulating a Thomistic 
environmental ethic, our analysis of Aquinas’s overarching theory of value, life and natural law 
should demonstrate his inconsistency in applying his thought to the non-human world.  
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 “Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things.”21
Reason Three: Animal Treatment in Christianity 
 Because Aquinas’s ethic is unapologetically Christian, it may be beneficial to say a few 
words regarding how Christianity has historically been perceived in the environmental 
movement. As was the case with Thomas, throughout the contemporary literature, Christianity is 
commonly maligned as being one of the primary culprits of the historical mistreatment of the 
non-human world. Peter Singer writes, “It is beyond dispute that mainstream Christianity, for its 
first 1,800 years, put non-human animals outside its sphere of concern. On this issue the key 
figures in early Christianity were unequivocal.”  This is evidenced by the many acts of extreme 22
animal cruelty that were not only permitted in medieval Christian Europe, but actively promoted. 
Various blood sports such as bear baiting and bull baiting played a major role in entertaining 
Europeans from the 12th to 19th century, with some specific sports set aside specifically to 
commemorate Christian festivals.  The sport of cock-throwing, for example, in which 23
participants would throw rocks at a rooster until it died of its injuries, was commonly played on 
Shrove Tuesday in England up until the 18th century.   24
 Additionally, claims regrading the environmentally callous nature of Christianity are 
substantiated by passages of Scripture such as the edenic mandate, where God commands 
humankind to subdue the earth and all of its creatures.  While many environmentally conscious 25
Christians and Jews view this command as one to care for creation rather than lord over it, there 
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have been relatively few efforts within evangelical Christianity to . Similarly, in 1 Corinthians 9, 
Paul indicates that some of the Scriptural commands that seem prima facie to benefit animals are 
actually in place for the benefit of man.  While Luke 12:6 states that God cares for non-human 26
creatures, this point is only made to emphasize how much more valuable Mankind is than the 
lesser creatures.  27
 This being said, it is not difficult to see why Thomas, perhaps more than any other figure 
in historical Christianity, is portrayed as a primary antagonist to the environmental project. In his 
response to Lynn White’s scathing denouncement of Judeo-Christian environmental values, 
Baird Callicott suggests that the intellectual legacy of ancient Greek natural philosophy is 
equally (if not more) culpable than that of Christianity.  He explains that though post-28
enlightenment Christians such as Newton and Galileo believed the scientific project to be a 
natural outworking of a belief in the imago dei and the idea that science was aimed at “thinking 
God’s thoughts after him,” “the details of the creator’s supposed thoughts were inspired by 
Pythagoras and Democritus, not Moses and Paul.”  Thus, when placing Thomas in an 29
intellectual tradition, he has the unhappy distinction of belonging to all culpable parties; not only 
was Thomas greatly influenced by the Judeo-Christian tradition, but also ancient Greek 
philosophy.   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CHAPTER THREE:THOMAS’S THEORY OF VALUE 
Thomas on Soul 
 One of the most pivotal features of any ethic is its underlying theory of value. This is 
especially true in environmental and animal welfare ethics, where non-human entities are often 
ascribed rights and intrinsic value. While no single excerpt of Thomas’s writing succinctly 
summarizes his theory of value, a comprehensive system can be derived from his remarks on the 
nature of the soul and his graded theory of beings.  
 A correct understanding of Thomas’s view of the soul is of upmost importance in 
understanding his theory of value, as his perspective is ultimately what will enable us to allocate 
intrinsic value to non-human animals. Those not familiar with Thomism or theists who accept the 
Aristotelian tradition may assume that all Christians are committed to some form of Cartesian 
dualism, particularly in the context of personhood. It is often presumed that Christianity must 
maintain that human beings are comprised of two distinct substances- namely, body and soul 
(mind)- in order to make sense of the orthodox Christian conception of the afterlife. It is not 
uncommon to find an emphasis on the primacy of the soul over the body in popular Christian 
literature. For example, George Macdonald writes: 
[Children] ought to be taught that they have bodies; and that their bodies die; while they 
themselves live on. Then they will not think, as old Mrs Tomkins did, that THEY will be 
laid in the grave. It is making altogether too much of the body, and is indicative of an 
evil tendency to materialism, that we talk as if we POSSESSED souls, instead of BEING 
souls.  30
This tendency of placing human identity in an immaterial substance has its roots in the often 
Platonic early Church fathers and theologians. Augustine, whose influence on both Thomas and 
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the whole of Christian theology is undeniable, emphasizes the distinct identities and properties of 
body and soul and paves the way for the popularization of Platonic ideas in Christian theology.  31
As Thomas puts it, the Platonic view of persons relates the soul to the body as a sailor to his 
ship; the soul is the rational and volitional identity, and the body is merely its vessel.  32
 Thomas, following Aristotle, explicitly denies this Platonic view of personhood. 
Embracing hylomorphism, Thomas denies that the human person is merely a “soul using a 
body,” but rather that both body and soul are essential components of personhood and ultimately 
of the some substance.  Simply put, the soul is the form of living bodies. Thomas noted that this 33
hylomorphic view could eradicate some of the most vexing difficulties of Plato’s theory of the 
soul, perhaps most notably the issue of how two distinct substances could be united and how 
such substances could interact with one another. While Plato needed some intermediate 
substance (something like Descartes’s pineal gland) to unite body and soul, Thomas had no need 
for such things. He writes: 
Some held that there is a certain spirit and humor existing as a medium between soul and 
body; other posited light; still others, the powers of the soul, or something else of this 
sort. But none of these [entities] are necessary if the soul is the form of the body, because 
anything whatever, inasmuch as it is a being, is one.  34
This idea that the soul is merely the form of a living body serves two purposes: first, it eliminates 
the common issues usually associated with with dualistic systems while still providing a 
meaningful distinction between body and soul; and secondly, it lays the groundwork for 
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metaphysical common ground between human and non-human living bodies. The Platonic/
Cartesian tradition typically dictates that human beings are the only ensouled creatures, as 
humans are supposed to be the only creatures that survive death according to orthodox Judeo-
Christian tradition. The Platonic idea that we are souls merely using a physical body alienates us 
from the rest of the physical world in a way the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition does not. 
Platonism has a tendency of vilifying the physical realm, such that death becomes a release from 
our burdensome physical bodies. The world of shadows is merely a prison that must be suffered 
until we reach our desired immaterial home.  
 It is not difficult to see how Platonism can easily produce a mindset that is not conducive 
to environmental or zoological responsibility. For Plato, the environment and all its non-human 
inhabitants constitute a shadowland that will ultimately be overcome by the brilliant realm of 
ideas. Rather than a common home, the environment becomes a purgatory. The Platonic 
emphasis on the impermanence and ultimate insignificance of our Earthly dwelling does little to 
inspire benevolence toward it, but instead vilifies it. The Aristotelian/Thomistic view, however, 
has an opposite effect; by defining soul merely as “the principle of life” and the form of living 
bodies, man becomes an essentially physical creature. For Aristotle and Thomas, the soul is 
intimately tied to the material body just as matter is to form. 
 Additionally, Aristotle is one of the first philosophers to characterize all life forms 
(including plants) as possessing the same life-giving principle. Prior to Aristotle, it was not 
uncommon to believe that the differences among life forms were too vast to be characterized by 
any single characteristic. Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, indicates that the differences 
!20
among plants, animals, and humans are too severe to warrant one single definition of “soul.”  35
Aquinas defends Aristotle’s definition by pointing out that creatures with graded capacities can 
fall under the same genus just as numbers with vastly different values can call under the same 
genus of “numbers.”  Just as the numbers 1 and 1057 have vastly different values yet can be 36
called numbers, so too can all living beings, regardless of their vast differences, be called 
“ensouled” beings (and thus occupy the same genus).  
Kinds of Souls 
 Now that we have established how Thomas defines soul, we are prepared to discuss what 
sorts of souls there are. Aquinas held that there are three divisions of soul, each suited to fulfill a 
specific function. The vegetative soul, the only part part common to all living things and the only 
division present in plant life, is responsible for the basic physical functions that keep any given 
organism alive. This includes nutritive, augmentative, and generative capacities. The second 
highest division, common to all higher-order animals and mankind, is the sensitive soul; this part 
is responsible for sensory experience, consciousness, and self-direction. The final division of the 
soul, found only in mankind, is the rational part. This part is responsible for our ability to think 
on our own actions, comprehend moral facts, and assists us in achieving our final end of 
knowledge and union with the Divine. While Thomas speaks of the vegetative soul, sensitive 37
soul, and rational soul, he makes it very clear that beings that possess two or more of these 
capacities do not possess a multiplicity of souls, but rather a single soul that possesses these 
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various potencies.  Thus, while non-human animals have a vegetative and sensitive soul, that is 38
not to say they possess two souls, but rather that their single soul possess these two capacities.  39
A Graded Theory of Value 
 As noted above, Aquinas divides beings into roughly four categories: inorganic (soulless) 
beings, plants (those that possess only a vegetative soul), animals (those that possess a sensitive 
soul), and finally human beings (those that possess the rational soul). One may be inclined to 
picture these divisions as one would a ladder; inanimate objects are on the lowest rung, plants 
above it, with human beings being the final rung. This conception, however, can be misleading. 
Thomas tells us that there is a graded ontology, with the lowest forms of animal life closely 
resembling the highest forms of plant life and vice versa. This gradation is similar from genus to 
genus, painting the picture of a gentle slope rather than clearly divided rungs, with the lowest 
forms of one genus having a great degree of resemblance to the highest forms of the one below 
it. Thomas writes:  
We are made to understand that the diversity of forms requires different grades of 
perfection. This is quite clear to one who observes the natures of things. He will find, in 
fact, if he makes a careful consideration, that the diversity of things is accomplished by 
means of gradations. Indeed, he will find plants above inanimate bodies, and above 
plants irrational animals, and above these intellectual substances. And among individuals 
of these types he will find a diversity based on the fact that some are more perfect than 
others, inasmuch as the highest members of a lower genus seem quite close to the next 
higher genus; and the converse is also true; thus, immovable animals are like plants.  40
 This seems to fit very well with our observations and intuitions of the animal kingdom. 
Thomas’s graded account of living beings makes good sense of our belief that chimpanzees and 
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humans have a remarkably high degree of similarities, both anatomically and cognitively. It has 
become clear to us through scientific investigation and ordinary observation that higher-order 
mammals such as elephants, whales, and apes have emotional and relational capacities that are 
not dissimilar to our own. This is predicted by Thomas’s view of soul and serves to demonstrate 
his theory’s veracity. 
 A graded theory of value flows naturally from this graded ontology- Thomas himself 
gives a categorical division of living things that has the potential to greatly inform a Thomistic 
theory of natural value. Thomas tells us that when one considers the multiplicity of forms, it is 
clear that each form possesses a varying degree of perfection.  Creatures with greater powers 41
(such as humans and higher-order mammals) possess a greater degree of perfection than those 
with lesser powers (such as plants and insects). For Thomas, beings with a higher degree of 
perfection have a greater degree of participation in God, as beings ultimately derive their being 
from Him. Though every creature is a “mirror” of God insofar as they manifest some degree of 
being, those with the highest degree of perfection best manifest God as the most perfect being. 
 This graded view of being and value is further manifested in the ancient Greek idea that 
the less perfect is subservient to the more perfect. According to Aristotle, this hierarchy of 
perfection mandates that plants are proper for the use of animals, and animals are proper for the 
use of man. Aristotle writes: 
Clearly we must suppose that nature also provides for them in a similar way when grown 
up, and that plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of 
man, the domestic species both for his service and for his food, and if not all at all events 
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most of the wild ones for the sake of his food and of his supplies of other kinds, in order 
that they may furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances.  42
Thomas gives us no reason to believe that he disagrees with Aristotle’s view of nature. Moreover, 
that it is proper for greater being to use the lesser is made plain to us by observation; no one 
doubts that plants are reliant upon inanimate resources for their existence, just as animals are 
reliant upon plants for their existence. It is not uncommon to describe an ecosystem’s health in 
terms of the realization of these dependencies; thus, a proper function of the ordered whole 
emerges from this hierarchy subserviency. 
 Being as Intrinsic Good 
 Thomas’s graded theory of value discussed above stems largely from his conception of 
being as goodness. Though this chapter is focused primarily on the metaphysics that 
substantiates Thomas’s theory of value, we must now turn to the most basic tenet of his 
metaethic, namely that goodness is convertible with being. As with Thomas’s explication of 
divine simplicity, perhaps the most precise way to flesh out Thomas’s view of being is through 
the employment of Frege’s sense and reference distinction.  Regarding Thomas’s conception of 43
goodness, Eleonore Stump writes that being and goodness are the same in reference, yet differ in 
sense. Put another way, being and goodness are convertible. This idea stems from his view that 44
desirability is a necessary component of goodness; that is, what is good is that which is properly 
desired. Stump writes, “If a thing is desirable as a thing of a certain kind, then, on Aquinas’s 
views, it is desirable to the extent to which it is perfect of that kind, i.e., to the extent to which it 
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is a whole, complete specimen, free from relevant defect.”  Thus, what makes something good  45
is that which perfects its nature.  As stated in the previous section, for Thomas, a thing is perfect 46
(good according to its form) insofar as it is in being. Thus, as Thomas says, “the perfection of 
anything is its goodness.”  4748
 Thomas’s view of being as goodness lays the foundation for a concept notoriously 
difficult to ground in competing environmental ethics: intrinsic value of non-human entities. 
While there is some very real sense that Aquinas sees animals and the environment as having 
only instrumental value as they relate to human beings, there is another sense in which all beings 
have value in themselves. Crudely put, on Thomas’s conception,“it is good to be.” Every being, 
by virtue of of its existence, is a manifestation of goodness. As we noted above, every being is 
necessarily a reflection of God on Thomas’s conception because all entities derive their being 
from Him. Even rocks are a reflection (albeit, a comparatively dim reflection) of the divine by 
way of their existence; that is, they reflect God’s nature insofar as they exist just as God exists. 
 This idea of creation as a reflection of God is further manifested in Thomas’s 
epistemology. God knows nothing through sense experience or inference; he does not “look at” 
his creation to know its contents or happening. Instead, Thomas believes that God intimately 
knows all things only through knowledge of himself.  One may wonder how this is possible; 49
how can beings that are distinct from God be known by God only through knowledge of himself? 
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Thomas responds by positing that God knows other creatures insofar as he is the cause of their 
being. He writes: 
From the fact that God understands Himself primarily and essentially we must posit that 
He knows in Himself things other than Himself. An effect is adequately known when its 
cause is known. So “we are said to know each thing when we know the cause.” But God 
Himself is through His essence the cause of being for other things. Since He has a most 
full knowledge of His essence, we must posit that God also knows other things.  50
He continues to say that “the likeness of every effect somehow preexists in its cause; for every 
agent produces its like. But whatever is in something is in it according to the mode of that in 
which it is. If, then, God is the cause of certain things, since according to His nature He is 
intellectual, the likeness of what He causes will exist in Him in an intelligible way.”  This view 51
of God’s knowledge necessitates that we participate in the divine nature.  By deriving our being 52
and powers from God, creation becomes a mirror of himself, reflecting his attributes and powers 
analogously through his creatures.  
Principle of Plenitude in Creation 
 If Creation is a mirror of the divine, it is not difficult to see how the multiplicity of 
creatures is appropriate to manifest the divine. Every species has its own set of properties and 
powers that make it uniquely suited to fulfill a specific telos. The multiplicity of these attributes 
constitute a much clearer picture of the divine than a single finite being ever could. This idea that 
that the world is comprised of a (perhaps maximally) diverse plethora of beings is commonly 
referred to as the “principle of plenitude.” Though this principle has been been a part of western 
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philosophy since ancient Greece, various ancient and medieval thinkers have have interpreted 
and applied it differently. The concept first seems to originate with Plato, where he indicates that 
the universe must contain every possible degree of being in order to be complete.  Following 53
Plato, Augustine used the Principle of Plenitude as a solution to the problem of evil. According to 
Augustine, a universe containing lesser and greater things (i.e., a hierarchy of being) is greater 
than a universe that only includes greater beings. This means, however, that by necessity, some 
beings will enjoy a greater and more enjoyable existence than others. Though this sort of world 
may contain more suffering than a world of only great beings, such a world is still preferable 
because being is manifested to a greater degree. Because being is convertible with goodness on 
Thomas’s account, God must create the world of greater being because God must, by nature, 
create the greatest world that he can. 
 Thomas’s notion of goodness was greatly influenced by Augustine and he seems to 
accept the augustinian conception that being is convertible with goodness; thus, for Aquinas, the 
best world will be the one that includes the greatest degree of being. Thomas’s view of the 
Principle of Plenitude is slightly different than that of Augustine’s, however; where Augustine 
saw the principle as implying that God must have necessarily created the greatest number of 
kinds of beings possible, Aquinas’s version of the principle is not as strong. Instead, Aquinas 
says only that it is fitting that God should create a great plurality of beings, as such a world 
would most fully manifest his nature.  54
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Evaluating Thomas’s Theory of Value 
 As argued in the previous chapter, Thomas’s notion that being and goodness are 
referentially identical, differing only in sense, is the foundation for a Thomistic theory of value. 
Ironically, Thomas is able to accomplish what so many contemporary environmental ethicists try 
very hard hard to do, namely, establish some philosophically robust basis for the intrinsic value 
of non-human (and even non-living) things. This point is perhaps best illustrated through a 
thought experiment. Imagine a distant planet (so distant, in fact, that no human technology could 
ever allow us to observe or otherwise come into contact with anyone or anything on its surface) 
filled with beautiful landscapes, lush vegetation, and cascading waterfalls. Though the planet 
would be remarkably pleasing to any intelligent observer, no sentient life exists on or anywhere 
in the vicinity of this planet. Due to its immeasurable distance from any sentient observer, the 
planet has no potential of ever being observed or cultivated for utilitarian purposes. Let us also 
suppose that the United States, through some remarkable advancement in astrophysics and 
military technology, has acquired the power to completely destroy this planet and all of its 
contents. As tensions begin to rise with some of the US’s adversaries, the president wishes to 
destroy the planet as a demonstration of the United State’s military and technological power. 
Does the USA have a moral obligation to refrain from destroying the planet, or would such an 
action be morally permissible? 
 Intuitively, there seems to be something deeply wrong with destroying entire 
environments and ecosystems, even when they can offer no utility or enjoyment to human 
persons. The prohibition of such an action seems to consign at least some sort on intrinsic value 
to lifeless landscapes; if we have ruled out any form of instrumental value, our only option is to 
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say it must have some value in itself. These types of thought experiments and the rationality that 
accompanies them have served as the springboard for several radically a-traditional ethical 
approaches. Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic, for example, seeks to extend a moral status not only to 
plants and animals, but to soil, water, and everything else that comprises the “biotic 
community.”  Similarly, the deep ecology movement, pioneered largely by Norwegian 55
philosopher Arne Naess, attributes equal intrinsic value to every living thing, regardless of 
consciousness, cognitive capacity, or relational ability.  56
 While these radical ethics attempt to explain why our intuitions may lead us to decide we 
ought not destroy the planet, they also seem to ignore seemingly obvious differences between 
mankind’s perceived moral status and that of animals. If all creatures have the same intrinsic 
value and moral worth as many of those in the deep ecology movement suppose, it is not at all 
clear what we ought to do when faced with moral dilemmas that cause us to choose either saving 
the lives of several animals or saving the life of one human. a Suppose you are sitting alone on a 
secluded beach when you notice that a fishing vessel has abandoned several of their nets that are 
now drifting toward the shore. As you are watching the nets, you suddenly notice the cries of two 
young dolphins struggling to free themselves from the snares, desperately gasping for air as they 
attempt to surface. As you go to assist them, you notice yet another cry coming from the water, 
this time from a young man who is quickly drowning from a similar entanglement several 
hundred feet in the distance. Let us suppose you are sure that you only have time to save either 
the two dolphins or the man, and that any attempt to save either would have a very good chance 
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of success. For most, the choice would be simple; humans are more valuable than animals, and 
the one man’s life is worth more than both of the dolphins. If all life has equal intrinsic value as 
deep ecology purports, however, the choice is much less clear, and would perhaps err on the side 
of saving two lives over one. Most of us are willing to admit, I think, that this seems quite 
wrong. Surely it is the case that humans are more valuable than animals, even the higher-order 
animals such as marine mammals and primates. 
 We find an unexpected middle ground in Thomas. He offers us a means of predicating 
intrinsic value to non-human creatures (and even soil, oceans, and mountains) without asserting 
that they more or equally as valuable as human beings. Following the Augustinian tradition, 
being is convertible with goodness for Aquinas. Things exhibit varying degrees of goodness 
insofar as they reflect the ultimate being, namely God. Even rocks reflect the divine by their 
mere existence; because “to be” is essentially good, rocks exhibit a characteristic of the divine 
insofar as they exist. Animals are more valuable than rocks because not only do they reflect the 
divine in mere existence, but in many other qualities as well. They mirror the divine in their 
ability to form relationships with their own kind and humans, through their capacity to make 
choices, and through their ability to think and solve problems. On this model of ontology, 
humans retain their perceived status as the most valuable of all creatures, as we reflect the divine 
to the greatest degree by our moral and rational capacities. Man is a rational animal, and 
rationality is the highest reflection of divinity. 
 Thus, I think it quite likely that Saint Thomas would tell us that we are not permitted to 
blow up the planet in question. Though it may be inanimate and thus does not reflect the divine 
in any sort of relational or cognitive way, its mere existence is sufficient for value. It is good to 
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exist, and thus bringing something out of existence without sufficient reason is irrational and 
thus evil. This ultimately provides us with an ontology that ascribes intrinsic value to water, 
landscapes, and soil as Leopold wishes, while at the same time preserving the primacy of the 
human species in accordance with our intuitions and classical conceptions of morality.  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CHAPTER FOUR: THOMAS ON ANIMALS 
What is an Animal? 
 As seen in the previous chapter, Thomas places animals above plants and inanimate 
objects in his hierarchy of being because of their more perfect natures. The closer a being is to 
resembling the perfection of God, the more perfect its nature is.  Because a single finite being 57
could never fully manifest God’s perfection, a plurality of being is required as dictated by the 
principle of plenitude. It is necessary to further explicate his beliefs about what an animal is and 
what sorts of capacities it possesses before we evaluate his zoological ethic. 
 To begin, Thomas notes that one way to distinguish between higher and lower animals is 
in terms of their locomotive power. While Thomas asserts that locomotive power is usually an 
attribute of animals, there are some lower-order animals that have sensation (which is the 
primary attribute that distinguishes plants from animals) but not locomotion, such as shellfish.  58
Self-motion is a necessary condition for an ensouled being,  and the degree by which an animal 59
can move itself is typically an indication of perfection.  The concept of self-motion as a 60
necessary condition for ensouled beings is difficult to interpret in light of Aquinas’s conception 
of instinct, which seems to resemble something of a mechanical process. Thomas writes the 
following regarding an animal’s ability to choose: 
Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in 
respect of several things that can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are 
altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference between 
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the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above, the sensitive appetite is 
determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, 
although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of 
nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular good. Consequently choice 
belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational 
animals have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.  61
In the next section, Thomas goes on to compare animals’ choices to that of an arrow shot from a 
bow. Just as the arrow can only move insofar as it is put into motion by the rational agent that 
moved it, so to are animals put into motion by God such that they move according to their 
ordained end.  62
 In another place, however, Thomas asserts that animals voluntarily move towards their 
end through a knowledge of their end. Though the rational animal is able to know their end as an 
end, even the irrational animal can know its end, even though its end is not known to the creature 
as an end.  Thomas concludes that the animal’s imperfect knowledge of its end is sufficient for 63
voluntary action.  This seems to contradict his earlier statements that compare animal choices to 64
mechanistic processes. How can Thomas say that animals act voluntarily and simultaneously 
without choice? 
 Judith Barad believes that this paradox can be solved by Thomas’s distinction between 
three levels of animal life that range from lower-order animals without a capacity for memory to 
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higher-order beings that exhibit captivities for behavioral adaptation through sense experience.  65
Aquinas writes: 
Now in some animals memory arises from the senses, but in others it does not; and for 
this reason the former are prudent and more capable of being taught than those which are 
unable to remember. Those which cannot hear sounds are prudent but unable to learn, as 
the bee and any other similar type of animal there may be. But any which have this sense 
together with memory are able to learn. Thus other animals live by imagination and 
memory…  66
From these distinctions, three classes of animals are established: the lowest animals, those that 
lack memory and hearing; intermediate animals, being those that possess memory but lack the 
capacity to hear; and the highest animals, which are those that have the capacity to both hear and 
remember. It is also worth noting that Aquinas ascribes an imagination to higher order animals, 
which seems to be indicative of vivid consciousness mental capacities. Given these distinctions, 
Barad believes that when Thomas speaks of animals acting mechanistically, he is referring only 
to lower order animals; when he refers to animals making voluntary choices based on knowledge 
of some end, he is referring to higher-order animals. This means that only lower-order animals 
act purely according to instinct, while higher-order animals have complex behavioral patterns 
that are not uniform within a single species. Barad’s interpretation of Aquinas (expanded upon by 
John Deely ) has at least two significant strengths. First, it reconciles some of the apparent 67
contradictions found in Aquinas’s treatment of animals, and secondly, it fits very well with 
Thomas’s graded ontology discussed in the previous chapter. If lower-order animals resemble 
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higher-order plans and higher-order animals resemble rational animals, it is only natural, and 
perhaps necessary, that there should be some significant divisions within the animal kingdom. 
Thomas writes: 
It should be noted, however, that not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the 
appetitive there is something which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its 
own nature and something else according as it has some slight participation in reason, 
coming into contact at its highest level of activity with reason at its lowest. There is 
verified here the statement of Dionysius that the divine wisdom ‘joins the ends of the 
first things to the beginnings of the second.’  68
This idea that higher-order animals have some “slight participation in reason” is one of Thomas’s 
most illuminating insights. Elsewhere, Thomas writes, “The cogitative and memorative powers 
in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain 
affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore 
they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.”  From this it 69
follows that the cognitive capacities of mankind and the highest animals are not entirely 
disparate, with a close resemblance between primitive modes of rationality and higher-order 
animal intelligence. 
 It is also worth noting that Thomas ascribes similarity between humans and animals 
regarding their emotional capacities. For Thomas, emotions in all creatures are a reaction to 
some fulfillment or frustration of some good (or at least a perceived good).  Thomas even goes 70
as far as to say that there is some analogy for the love a husband and wife share in the animal 
kingdom. In his treatment of marriage in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas writes: 
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Furthermore, the greater that friendship is, the more solid and long-lasting will it be. 
Now, there seems to be the greatest friendship between husband and wife, for they are 
united not only in the act of fleshly union, which produces a certain gentle association 
even among beasts, but also in the partnership of the whole range of domestic activity.  71
A Thomistic Zoological Epistemology 
 We have already established that certain animals possess cognitive and memorative 
capacities similar to human beings, and now we shall go on to examine animal knowledge in 
light of Thomas’s classical epistemology. While a thorough explication of his detailed system is 
impossible here, a basic understanding should be sufficient for our purposes. Succinctly put, we 
obtain knowledge by abstracting the form of an object from a material particular. I come to 
knowledge of what it means to be a man through abstracting the form of “manness” via 
observation of particulars. I can make conceptual distinctions between a thing’s form and the 
matter that instantiated it such that I come to knowledge of universals.  
 It should go without saying that Aquinas would not ascribe any sort of knowledge to 
plants, as they do not have the capacity to have sense experience and are not conscious. Animals, 
however, seem to have the capacity to abstract to varying degrees. Upon seeing me, my dog 
immediately recognizes that I am his caregiver; that is, through experience, my dog has 
abstracted a shape, smell, appearance, etc. from a particular (myself). This knowledge is not as 
complete as human knowledge, however, because the dog does not seem to be abstracting 
universals, but only particular forms. Brad notes, however, that we do have some evidence of 
animals abstracting general principles through experience of particulars.  For example, one 72
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study rewarded dolphins if and only if a new trick was performed. Eventually, the dolphins 
discovered that old tricks would not be rewarded and began jumping and contorting themselves 
in new ways.  Thus, the process by which the dolphins discovered that new tricks would be 73
rewarded is the same way basic concepts are formed in humans. Particular instances of reward 
were observed and general principles were formed based on experience of specific situations. 
Barad takes this as evidence that the dolphins arrive at some general principle such as “all new 
tricks will be rewarded.”  This is significant because such abstraction, even at this very basic 74
level, means that the dolphin is surpassing purely memorative or instinctual capacities. 
 Another insightful claim that Thomas makes is that man and animals share largely the 
same same senses, including what he calls the estimative sense, which he considers to be one of 
the highest faculties of animal cognition.  According to Thomas, there are three “grades” of 75
animal cognition. Thomas writes, “The first of these is something which seems to be common to 
all animals , namely, that they have a certain connatural faculty [i.e., potency, i.e., power] for 76
estimating about sense-perceptible things.”  For Thomas, the estimative sense is the ability to 77
judge whether or not an object poses a potential for pleasure or danger without having 
experienced the thing in the past. Thomas writes: 
Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable 
things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has 
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a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in 
which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal 
needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise 
to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as 
the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a 
natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to 
the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to 
perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct 
principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an 
immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those 
intentions.  78
The fact that Thomas attributes an estimative sense to animals has huge implications for their 
epistemology, as it highlights the similarities between human and animal cognition. First, it 
means that animals have the ability to judge whether or not a being is beneficial or dangerous to 
its nature purely through abstracting some particular’s form. By implication, the animal has some 
innate knowledge of some properties of a thing even on experiencing it for the first time (i.e., it’s 
usefulness, predatory potential, relative power, etc.). This estimative sense is clearly manifested 
in every higher order animal, and the degree to which it is accurate is often astonishing. When 
my dog was exposed to the sound of fireworks for the first time, she ran and hid because she 
estimated that they pose some danger to her. To some important degree, she was right in doing 
so, as close proximity to an exploding firework would do great harm to any animal. She did not 
know to run and hide because of some past experience with fireworks, but rather because of her 
properly functioning estimative sense.  
 It should also be noted that some animals seem to have a more acute estimative sense 
than humans in some circumstances. For example, it is not uncommon to hear reports of dogs 
who have alerted their owners to potential malicious persons who intended harm before the 
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person is aware that such a danger is present. In these instances the dog, having never met the 
dangerous person before, innately intuit the danger through some external sense. This is 
significant because, according to Aquinas, these internal senses (estimative, memorial, 
imaginative, etc.) are cognitive, operating independently of the external senses. Thus, it seems 
that some animals possess some cognitive faculties to a greater degree than humans in some 
specific cases.  
Thomas on the Natural Right 
 In the Summa Theologica, Thomas makes a distinction between two kinds of rights, 
namely natural and positive rights. Natural rights include things due to a thing by its nature, 
while positive rights are those that arise out of common agreements or contracts.  Thomas says 79
that man is, by nature, commensurate with a woman to beget offspring by her; this is an example 
of a natural right. For Thomas, “right” is the object of justice.  Given this definition, it may 80
come as some surprise that Thomas extends the natural right not only to humans, but also to 
animals. He writes, “Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a 
thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is common to us and other animals 
according to the first kind of commensuration.”  81
 Because the natural right is something due to an object given its nature, a modest 
interpretation of the above passage is simply to state that animals, like humans, have goods that 
are appropriate to the kind of beings that they are. All mammals, for example, have a natural 
“right” to procreate through sexual activity between a male and female. This is a good that 
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humans and non-human animals have in common. We need to be careful here, however, not to 
interpret this passage using enlightenment conceptions of “rights.” While Aquinas seems to have 
some conception of “human rights” as we now understand them, Thomas’s notion of “right” and 
the enlightenment conception of “rights” is clearly distinct.  Thomas is not talking about some 82
innate objective entitlement, which is what post-enlightenment Westerners typically think of 
when using the word “right.” Instead, Thomas just means that there is some basic notion of 
equity even among animals in the sense that they aim to use only what is required by their 
nature. Regardless, it is clear that Thomas is saying that animals have natural “rights” according 
to their natures, just as is the case with mankind.  Simply put, animals have things that are 83
commensurate with their natures that result in an achievement of some good if realized. 
Thomas’s Applied Ethic of Animal Treatment 
 As we have seen above, Thomas gives us a very detailed account of the value, cognitive 
powers, and intrinsic worth of non-human animals. In summary, it has been shown that higher 
order animals are creatures with a high degree of perfection, “participating” in practical reason in 
ways not dissimilar to primitive rationality. They are creatures who “voluntarily” act and move 
themselves based on knowledge of their own end. Thomas’s hierarchy of being places them just 
beneath humans, indicating a higher degree of intrinsic value than inanimate objects and plants 
because of degree of perfection and likeness to the divine. Given these things, one may expect 
that Thomas should come away with a rather high view of animals. Surprisingly, the opposite is 
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the case. As noted in the first chapter, Thomas himself seems to have a rather low view of 
animals when it comes to applied ethics. He writes: 
We refute the error of those who claim that it is a sin for man to kill brute animals. For 
animals are ordered to man’s use in the natural course of things, according to divine 
providence. Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing them or 
by employing them in any other way.  84
And later: 
Indeed, if any statements are found in Sacred Scripture prohibiting the commission of an 
act of cruelty against brute animals, for instance, that one should not kill a bird 
accompanied by her young (Deut. 22:6), this is said either to turn the mind of man away 
from cruelty which might be used on other men, lest a person through practicing cruelty 
on brutes might go on to do the same to men; or because an injurious act committed on 
animals may lead to a temporal loss for some man, either for the agent or for another 
man.  85
Thomas repeatedly emphasizes that is permissible to treat animals only as instruments, without 
any regard of them as ends of themselves. Why is it that Thomas’s ontology and theory of value 
seem to be opposed to one another? Perhaps the best explanation is that 13th century zoology did 
not equip Thomas to accurately apply his philosophical system. In other words, Thomas is not 
advocating animal mistreatment on the basis of faulty philosophy, but rather on incorrect 
scientific sources.  
 To begin, some places of Thomas’s writings seem to imply prima facie that he viewed all 
animals as merely machines; unconscious organisms that move only according mechanical 
processes. Many interpreters of Thomas believe that he unequivocally asserts that animals are 
slaves to instinct, which he seems to take to be an entirely deterministic mechanism. He writes: 
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Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in 
motion; they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of 
which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.  86
It should be noted that Aquinas is often wrongly accused of portraying all animals as automata. 
Passages like the one above are usually qualified in Thomas’s writings. Here, when Thomas 
refers to “dumb animals,” we have good reason to believe that he is not referring to all non-
rational animals as some take him to mean, but rather only “lower-order” animals. This 
interpretation is more sensible for at least three reasons. First, Thomas’s explicit use of the 
adjective “dumb” indicates that he is not referring to every non-human animal; elsewhere when 
he means all non-human animals, he simply uses the term “animals.”  It should be noted that 87
elsewhere Thomas uses the term “perfect animal” to refer to higher-order animals only, so it 
makes good sense that he should have a corollary term to denote only lower-order animals. 
Second, the fact that Aquinas mentions plants and “dumb animals” together indicates he is 
referring to all animals on the low end of his hierarchy of being, providing further context for 
interpretation. Thirdly, this interpretation makes more sense of Thomas’s statements that perfect 
animals act voluntarily, which seems to be opposed to his mechanistic understanding of instinct.  
 Though Aquinas already saw higher-order animals as similar in mode of existence to 
human beings, modern science has given us more reasons to believe that that the link between 
humanity and the animal kingdom is greater than Aquinas could have supposed. If any form of 
evolution is true, it lends credence to the idea that humans and non-human animals have fewer 
meaningful differences than Aquinas could have justifiably imagined. While some have alleged 
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that evolution is not compatible with Christian theism, many Catholics who embrace the 
Thomistic tradition have accepted evolution as an accurate scientific theory.  Given this major 88
shift from mankind being a creation totally separate from all other creatures to being created by 
God via gradual processes, one should expect a drastic change in how a Thomistic ethic may be 
applied to animals. Because Aquinas had no reason to doubt that man was an entirely separate 
creation, it is not difficult to see how he would have believed that mankind is entirely removed 
from the rest of the animal kingdom.  Evolution, however, tells a different story; if evolution is 89
true, it certainly seems reasonable to believe that while animals clearly do not possess the same 
degree of rational, emotional, and cognitive capacities as humans, they likely possess these 
attributes in analogous, albeit lesser, forms- an idea that fits particularly nicely with Aquinas’s 
graded ontology. 
 Similarly, though animal psychology is still an emerging field, some emerging scientific 
findings may find fault with Thomas’s conception of animal freedom. Thomas denies that 
animals possess any sort of “free will” as humans do; instead, animals are driven by necessity to 
act in accordance with their ends, often relying on instinct to determine their actions. Recent 
studies in animal neuroscience suggests that some higher order mammals such as dolphins, apes, 
and chimpanzees seem to make decisions such that, on a physiological level, the deliberative 
process is nearly indistinguishable.  It remains a valid question, however, whether or not such 90
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finding could even theoretically invalidate Thomas’s theory of human freedom, as the rational 
capacity to deliberate persists in an immaterial part of the human person.  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CHAPTER FIVE: A NATURAL LAW AND VIRTUE APPROACH TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
Thomas’s Moral Philosophy 
 So far I have argued that Thomas’s graded ontology and metaethic naturally results in a 
graded perfectionist theory of value that categorizes distinct species in ways that satisfy our 
intuitions, giving appropriate credence to relevant similarities and obvious differences. Now that 
we have explicated the relevant features of Thomas’s metaphysic, we will now begin analyzing 
his moral philosophy, ultimately applying it to environmental and zoological issues. Thomas’s 
metaethic combines two distinct moral theories, namely natural law theory and virtue ethics. 
Both share a co-dependent relationship on Thomas’s account. Thomas’s metaethic is ultimately 
grounded in the Augustinian notion that being and goodness share the same referent, differing 
only in sense.  Thus, a thing is good insofar as it exists and actualizes its species-specific 91
potential. The more a thing’s nature is perfected, the better it becomes as member of its species. 
Thus, Thomas’s theory of right action can be summarized as follows: An action is good if and 
only if (and because) it leads to the perfection of a thing’s nature, thus bring about some intrinsic 
good. Conversely, an action is wrong if and only if (and because) it leads to a diminishing of 
perfection, thus frustrating some intrinsic good.  
 This theory of right action ultimately becomes Thomas’s foundation for his virtue ethic. 
Because goodness is ultimately achieved through perfection of a being, actions and habits that 
lead to such perfection are considered good actions. Generally, perfection is achieved via the 
exercise of species-defining powers; that is, a thing becomes more perfect when it acts in 
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accordance with how its nature dictates it should appropriately act. For example, as a rational 
animal, one of mankind’s species defining powers is to act rationally. Thus, one acts to perfect 
his nature when one acts in accordance with reason. Qualities that demonstrate proper exercise of 
these species-defining powers are called virtues. The four cardinal virtues are human virtues 
because they are qualities that indicate a proper exercise of reason regarding different facets of 
human life. For example, Prudence is simply right reason applied to practice.  Temperance is 92
right reason applied to passions and desires.  Thus, the virtues represent habits that, when 93
applied, bring about a proper exercise of reason, and, in turn, the perfection of one’s nature as a 
rational being. 
 Similarly, perfection of nature and attainment of teleology is what dictates what Thomas 
calls the natural law. According to Thomas, there exists first principles (precepts) of both 
demonstrative and practical reason.  These first principles are the foundation on which all other 94
precepts are derived. The laws of logic, for example, are considered the first principles of 
demonstrative reason because their truth value is self-evident in the sense that it is immediately 
known to be true provided that one has an adequate understanding of the concepts involved. 
Practical reason has its own set of precepts that ground propositions included in the natural law. 
For Thomas, the first principle of practical reason (known as the synderesis principle) is that 
good should be done and pursued, while evil should be avoided.  All other precepts contained 95
within the natural law are derived from this principle. Given this precept, if one knows what is 
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good, one knows what ought to be pursued. Thus, Thomas seeks to explicate the intrinsic goods 
that are proper our species. Because Thomas believes that the good is that which is ultimately 
desired, intrinsic goods are discovered via observing inclinations.  From this, Thomas deduces 96
four primary intrinsic goods: life, procreation, knowledge, and sociability.  All precepts of the 97
natural law either command an action insofar as it leads to the attainment of one of these goods 
or prohibits an action insofar as it frustrates one of these goods. Thus, murder is a violation of the 
natural law because it frustrates life, lying frustrates sociability, etc.  
Natural Law and Animal Treatment 
 Now that we have given a brief exposition of Thomas’s metaethic, we may now analyze 
how this system should be accurately applied to the issues at hand. Both the natural law and 
virtue components of Thomas’s ethic have ramifications for environmental and animal treatment; 
the former will be treated in this section, and the latter in the next.  
 As stated above, Thomas’s natural law theory states that goods can be deduced by 
observing what beings are inclined toward and what contributes to a thing’s proper function. As 
Thomas says, a precept of the natural law is born of something that is due.  Additionally, a thing 98
can be due in two senses, namely for itself or for the sake of another. Thomas goes on to say that 
in every genus, that which is due for its own sake ought to take precedence over what is due for 
the sake of another.  This is pertinent when one considers that Thomas is ultimately deriving 99
obligation from teleology (i.e., a thing’s being due). As Thomas’ says, “Since a precept of law is 
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binding, it is about something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from 
the necessity of some end.”  Thus, if precepts of law are formed via ends, and ends that are 100
proper to a being itself should take precedence over use for the sake by another, it seems to 
follow that an animal’s ends should take priority over human use. For example, though an 
elephant’s tusks have a variety of human uses, the elephant itself uses those tusks for its own 
ends (fighting, digging, etc.).  Because Thomas asserts that ends proper to a thing itself take 101
precedence over use of another, the natural law seems to prohibit such activities. As Barad says, 
“And insofar as animals use their capacities as they are due, these capacities can be matters of 
precept.”  This reasoning comports well with Thomas’s admission that animals participate in 102
the natural right, as established in the previous chapter.  
 Using this framework, it is fairly easy to deduce what sorts of actions are prohibited by 
an animal’s participation in the natural law. Thomas readily admits that we share many of our 
intrinsic goods with animals. He writes, “There is in man an inclination to things that pertain to 
him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in 
virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, ‘which nature has 
taught to all animals.’”  Life, procreation, and socialization all seem to be goods that we share 103
with higher order animals. The good of knowledge is even partially shared by animals in some 
sense, as evidenced by their inclination to educate their young.  Thus, generally speaking, any 104
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action that prematurely frustrates the life of an animal, deprives it of socialization, or causes it 
some other undue suffering should be prohibited by the natural law. 
 Though Thomas did not draw these conclusions, it seems that a consistent application of 
his metaethic and ontology requires him to do so. Thus, Barad suggests that there are two ways 
that Thomists can apply Thomas’s thought consistently: one can either agree with Thomas that 
animals should be treated merely as instruments, which would require a substantial rework of his 
ontology, metaphysic, and metaethic; or one could grant that we have real moral obligations to 
animals because of the type of being that they are, which would require only a reconsideration of 
peripheral scientific issues.  Clearly, the latter option will be most attractive to Thomists who 105
wish to stay true to the pillars of his thought; it seems that Thomas was just wrong in the 
application of his ethic, and that the system itself offers a robust and intellectually satisfying 
means of grounding a responsible animal treatment ethic. 
 Given what has been said above, a few important qualifications must now be made. It 
should be noted that this application of natural theory does not necessarily entail that we ought 
not frustrate any good of any higher order animal; it does, however, mean that animals ought not 
be used in a manner inconsistent with the animal’s purposes. Some may be inclined to think that 
this sort of Thomistic ethic necessarily entails vegetarianism, or at the very least a prohibition of 
killing higher-order mammals for food. I do not believe that this necessarily follows. It seems 
plausible (and indeed likely on Thomas’s account) that some animals are purposed to be food for 
other animals, both human and non-human. This should be expected given Thomas’s assertion 
that the less perfect beings exist for the sake of the more perfect ones. Given the nature of the 
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created order, it is beyond doubt that one of the intended purposes of the ringed seal is to provide 
sustenance for the polar bear. If the seals or some other similar marine mammal did not exist, the 
polar bear would, of course, cease to exist as well. The seal’s existence (or something similar to 
the seal) is necessary for the polar bear’s existence. While the seal certainly has basic goods 
proper to itself as a species, a more general good is still achieved in the ending of its life for 
food.  
 Thomas addresses this issue directly in the Summa Theologica. He says, “in the parts of 
the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble 
for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst 
each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe.”  From this, it is clear 106
that Thomas postulates at least two ends for each being: an end that is proper to the thing itself 
that directly contributes to the perfection of its own being, and an end that serves to perfect a 
greater whole. Thomas indicates that while a thing first exists for its own proper good, the thing’s 
contribution (via proper function) to the good of the whole is a necessary component of the 
universes’s fulfillment of its own teleology.  107
 This leads us to the distinction of two corresponding types of goods: the first, which we 
will call private goods, are goods that are specific to individual beings and species. All animals 
and plants have private goods, i.e., the things that lead to the perfection of their natures. If it is 
undesirable that these goods should be frustrated, how is it that the killing of animals for food 
could be permissible? The answer lies, in part, in the second kind of good, which we will call a 
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common good. Common goods are states of affairs that indirectly contribute to the attainment of 
private goods and can sometimes serve to justify the frustration of private goods.  Consider, for 108
example, what happens when deer populations are left unchecked by natural predators or human 
hunters. Often populations will grow beyond what the natural environment can accommodate, 
causing a shortage of food for the deer to eat. In serious cases, this can lead to the death of nearly 
the entire population of deer in a given area. Thus, while the private good of individual deer is to 
not be killed by a predator, it serves the common good that at least some are. Thus, even though 
the natural end of the deer is being frustrated, the common good (a general state of affairs that 
pertains to all deer) is better served if some private goods are frustrated. From this account, two 
things can be learned: first, it seems that, at least in some instances, it is morally permissible to 
frustrate certain private goods for the benefit of the common good. We must remember that while 
each organism has its own end, on the Thomistic account, the ecosystems, environments, and the 
universe as a whole are ordered to have their own ends. Some of these ends may conflict with 
private ends, and it seems that the common good should prevail over private goods, as the former 
is often a necessary condition for the latter. Thus, at the very least, we are permitted to kill 
animals when it serves the common good. We are strictly prohibited, however, to kill animals for 
food (or other utilitarian purposes) if it frustrates both the private and common good. 
 Additionally, there is good reason to believe that some higher-order mammals are 
intended to serve as sustenance for the human race. It is not immoral to kill a chicken for food 
because it is likely that this is one of the purposes for which chickens were intended. This, 
however, does not give us license to treat chickens in any way we see fit. Using chickens in a 
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way not intended by God (which would certainly include inflicting unnecessary pain or 
needlessly depriving them of a basic good) is prohibited under our Thomistic ethic. Thus, while 
we have an ethic that permits killing an animal for food, it has little tolerance for any instance of 
animal cruelty. Though there is nothing inherently wrong with eating meat itself, we ought not 
support industries that needlessly deprive animals of their basic goods, as such behavior is 
unequivocally unethical given the moral system we are formulating here. 
 It should also be noted here that we have grounds for believing that some animals are not 
intended to be used as food, and we are thus prohibited from using them as such. For example, 
many of us in the west find China’s Yulin dog meat festival to be morally abhorrent. As of July 
2015, over 1.5 million people had signed an online petition calling for an end to the annual 
celebration that slaughters about 10,000 dogs for their meat.  Why is it the case that while 109110
most of us have no qualms about millions of cows, chickens, and pigs being killed daily for their 
meat, we find this particular festival appalling? The ethic we have developed here is well 
equipped to answer this question. It is beyond dispute that dogs have remarkable relational 
capacities that make them well suited for human companionship. They are highly perceptive of 
human vocal and physical cues to the point that service dogs can sense an impending medical 
emergency before many humans. Our dogs have a tendency to calm us down, cheer us up, and 
provide companionship better than most all other species. For Thomas, a being’s teleology is 
deduced by discovering what it “is good for” and what it is inclined towards. While cows and 
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chickens may be good for food, it seems quite clear that other animals are much better suited for 
other purposes. We find the Yulin dog meat festival repulsive not because there is some inherent 
evil to eating meat, but because we think that dogs aren’t intended for that purpose. We know 
they are good for companionship because of their acute relational capacities, and we find the 
frustration of that end, particularly because of the emotional benefit it is to us, repulsive. This is 
just one of the many ways an application of Thomas’s teleological ethic demonstrates the 
theory’s veracity and explanatory power. 
Environmental Virtues 
 Applying virtue semantics and concepts to environmental ethics has gained significant 
popularity over the past 10-20 years. While virtue language has been occasionally used since 
environmental ethics formed as a discipline in the 1970s, the first prominent full-fledged virtue 
approach to environmental ethics was Louke Van Wensveen’s book Dirty Virtues released in 
2000. More recently, Ronald Sandler’s 2007 book Character and Environment has been hugely 
influential in contemporary discussions. While a detailed account of contemporary 
environmental virtue ethics cannot be supplied here, I hope to provide a brief account of the 
project’s primary goals and then explore how Thomas’s metaethic can meaningfully interact with 
the current discussion. According to Ronald Sandler, there are three fundamental approaches to 
environmental virtue ethics: the virtue theory approach, the environmental exemplar approach, 
and the extensionist approach.  These categories will structure our discussion as we examine 111
our own Thomistic approach to environmental virtues. 
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 Environmental Exemplar Approach- The environmental exemplar approach aims to 
identify environmental virtues based on firmly-held beliefs about who we consider to be virtuous 
with respect to their actions and attitudes toward the environment. While figures such as Aldo 
Leopold and Henry David Thoreau may come to mind for contemporary environmental ethicists, 
it is appropriate here to consider a lesser known environmental hero who happens to be a near-
contemporary of Aquinas’s, namely Saint Francis of Assisi. While Western Christianity is often 
cited as the principal cause of many of our environmental crisis, Saint Francis stands alone as a 
beacon of overwhelming Christian kindness toward animals, care for the environment, and 
respect for all facets of creation. His influence is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that Pope 
John Paul II declared Francis the Patron Saint of Ecology in 1979.  Francis was widely known 112
for his care and compassion of animals, calling each creature “brother” or “sister” because of our 
shared origin as a creation of our heavenly father.  Thomas of Celano writes of Francis’s great 113
compassion even towards lower animals and insects: “Even towards little worms he glowed with 
exceeding love…Wherefore he used to pick them up in the way and put them in a safe place, that 
they might not be crushed by the feet of passers by.”  If any person in the history of 114
Christendom could be said to exhibit environmental virtues, without doubt, it would be Francis.  
 Is it possible, then, to abstract environmental virtues from a study of heroes such as Saint 
Francis? While I believe the answer is ultimately yes, it seems that a study of environmental 
exemplars alone is insufficient for determining an exhaustive list of virtues or adjudicating 
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between competing and conflicting accounts of virtue. Sandler also notes that some exemplars, 
while possessing an overall attitude toward the environment that is praiseworthy, may have 
distorted or narrow views in particularly areas that could cause us to mistake environmental vice 
for virtue (or vice versa).  Thus, while the environmental exemplar approach can be used to 115
guide our discussion of virtues, ultimately another principle will be necessary. 
 Extensionist Approach- The extensionist approach to environmental ethics attempts to 
apply traditional virtues and principals to environmental affairs. This attempt is perhaps initially 
more attractive given our Thomistic project, as Aquinas clearly delineates the four cardinal and 
three theological virtues, of which all other virtues are derivative. The extensionist approach 
merely asks how one ought to apply prudence, temperance, hope, love, etc. to other non-human 
animals and the environment.  
 It is worth noting, I think, that some of Aquinas’s virtues do seem to extend easily and 
without modification to environmental/zoological matters. Thomas’s notion of beneficence, for 
example, extends to non-human beings without difficulty. Aquinas even writes that “beneficence 
is an effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the inferior.”  He also 116
indicates that beneficence and charity are primarily a state of mind or attitude, emphasizing that 
“charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good 
to anyone if we have time to spare.”   117
 It seems quite reasonable to believe this disposition toward beneficence will naturally 
extend beyond treatment of humans to beneficence toward the non-human world. This is 
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evidenced in Thomas’s fear that the mistreatment of animals results in inclinations toward 
mistreating one’s fellow man; if violence toward animals disposes one to violence against 
mankind, it seems, at least prima facie, that beneficence towards animals should spur one to 
beneficence towards mankind. This is a significant insight; even if one does not accept that it is 
intrinsically wrong to mistreat animals, Thomas gives us a sufficient reason to refrain from doing 
so; abusing animals, though not wrong by nature of the act itself, will incline you towards evil. 
One who abuses animals will not function properly according to Thomas. This principle has 
recently been clearly demonstrated empirically; according to the American Human Association, 
pets were abused in 88% of households in which child abuse was present.  These sorts of 118
statistics serve to validate Thomas’s principle that virtuous behavior must be extended to 
animals, as their mistreatment cultivates the same sorts of vices as the mistreatment of other 
humans. 
 Sandler points out that translating such virtues from the context of interpersonal 
relationships to the context of the non-human (and even non-living) world is often difficult 
because in order for the virtues in question to remain virtues, the considerations that justify them 
as virtues must be present in both contexts.  For example, it seems fairly clear that any attempt 119
to extend Aquinas’s virtue of charity to non-living ecosystems will not be successful. Thomas 
even addresses such attempts directly in the Summa Theologica, stating that irrational entities 
cannot be the subject of charity because charity is a kind of friendship that involves a reciprocal 
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relationship and fellowship, something that is not possible with non-living beings.  This being 120
said, if we desire to derive any environmental virtue by extension of more generic virtues, we 
must proceed with caution; while there may well be instances in which the relevant 
considerations are present in both traditional and environmental contexts as is the case with 
beneficence and animals, there will often be obstacles to a straightforward extension of every 
virtue. 
 Virtue Theory Approach- The virtue theory approach seeks to develop a new set of 
environmental virtues from an appeal to common principles that serve as what we will call 
“virtue-making properties,” which are essentially features of actions that contribute to some 
environmental good. In other words, this approach seeks to identify environmentally good states 
of affairs and makes virtues of the actions that contribute to the attainment of such goods. 
Thomas offers a very straightforward virtue-making property in his natural law theory, i.e., a 
virtue being a habit that inclines one towards the perfection of his nature. 
 While this approach may initially seem antithetical to the Thomistic project because it 
tries to establish new virtues based on perceived goods, it seems some synthesis is possible. 
While Thomas rigidly defines the four cardinal (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) and 
theological (faith, hope, charity) virtues, it is clear that more specific habits will arise through the 
exercise of these virtues. For example, it is not difficult to see how some conception of 
conservation as a virtue can be drawn from temperance. Much of our environmental crisis stems 
from an overuse of natural resources, i.e., an excess. Because temperance is an exercise of right 
reason regarding human passions and consumption, it seems that the notion of conservation may 
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be already entailed in the virtue of temperance. Thus, we arrive at a “new” environmental virtue 
in the sense that some specific habit is explicated based on its effect on the environment, 
however the newly explicated virtue is in some sense already contained in the cardinal virtues. 
This seems to be the most desirable Thomistic approach to environmental virtue ethics. When 
extension is possible, Thomas’s virtues should just be straightforwardly extended to the 
environment. When extension is not possible or unclear in application, a virtue theory approach 
should be employed, qualified by the principle that every derived virtue should be rooted in one 
of the cardinal or theological virtues.  
Anthropocentrism and the Environment 
 Now that we have seen how Thomas’s natural law theory and virtue ethic can be applied 
to contemporary environmental ethics, it is beneficial to remark on one of the perceived negative 
features of Thomas’s overarching moral system, namely his commitment to anthropocentrism. 
As previously noted, Thomas’s metaethic is undeniably and essentially anthropocentric; 
anthropocentrism is blatantly assumed in all of his treatments on ethics. This seems to follow 
necessarily from his hierarchical ontology that denotes human beings as the most valuable 
material organism. While anthropocentrism has been vilified in much of the contemporary 
literature regarding environmental ethics, one need not abandon it in order to spur one towards 
environmental responsibility. In his papal encyclical Laudato Si’, Pope Francis makes a 
distinction between “tyrannical anthropocentrism” and anthropocentrism properly understood.  121
The former is rightly vilified, as this form of anthropocentrism acknowledges human use the only 
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end of all material things, including animals and the environment. Accepting the Thomistic 
tradition, Francis writes: 
In our time, the Church does not simply state that other creatures are completely 
subordinated to the good of human beings, as if they have no worth in themselves and 
can be treated as we wish. The German bishops have taught that, where other creatures 
are concerned, “we can speak of the priority of being over that of being useful”.The 
Catechism clearly and forcefully criticizes a distorted anthropocentrism: “Each creature 
possesses its own particular goodness and perfection... Each of the various creatures, 
willed in its own being, reflects in its own way a ray of God’s infinite wisdom and 
goodness. Man must therefore respect the particular goodness of every creature, to avoid 
any disordered use of things”.  122
 Thomas’s influence on Pope Francis’s is clearly and beautifully manifested in this 
excerpt. It incorporate’s Thomas’s notion of being as an intrinsic good, his assertion that all 
beings are a reflection of the divine, and that all actions must be in accordance with 
“ordered” (ordained, teleological)  use of things. This is the sort of anthropocentrism that should 
be embraced in a Thomistic environmental ethic. Though mankind maintains his role as 
penultimate and most valuable physical thing, he is not the only valuable thing. One can even 
meaningfully maintain that all lower beings “exist for the sake of man” as Thomas did without 
succumbing to a tyrannical anthropocentrism. For example, consider a mother and father who 
buys a puppy for their dog-loving child. While the parents are ultimately getting the puppy for 
the sake of the child rather than for the sake of the dog, this does not mean that the parents ignore 
the goods and needs proper to the dog. While the ultimate end of keeping dogs is for human 
happiness, the dogs themselves have natural ends that we are obligated to bring about. Thus, 
though the dog may be owned for the sake of humans, their own ends and value need not (and 
should not) be forfeited.  
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The Thomistic Ethic Applied 
 Now that we have seen how a Thomistic ethic can be situated in an environmentally 
responsible framework, I will conclude by demonstrating the theory’s functionality via its 
application to contemporary environmental and animal treatment issues. 
 Conservation of Endangered Species- A Thomist ought to be concerned about the 
possible extinction of endangered species and work to prevent such a realization. Most species 
that are critically endangered are (1) endangered solely due to human exploitation and (2) are 
higher-order mammals.  We have established that these animals have an ontological status only 123
relatively slightly less than humans and thus possess a higher degree of intrinsic value than most 
other created beings because of their more perfect natures. We, in turn, are obligated to prevent 
the frustration of their basic goods if possible. Moreover, the principle of plenitude dictates that a 
wide array of beings is necessary to fittingly reflect the divine essence. Every instance of 
extinction permanently removes a being from the spectrum, diminishing the reflection of the 
divine in our world. By causing extinctions, human are snuffing out rays of the divine light that 
will never be recovered, leading to mitigated revelation of God’s goodness. 
 Climate Change- This Thomistic ethic provides numerous reasons to be concerned about 
human-induced global warming. If the current scientific consensus regarding the seriousness of 
climate change is accurate, we ought to do everything in our power to prevent it in order to 
preserve things that serve basic human goods. By failing to reduce climate change, we are 
indirectly frustrating the common goods that are derivative of a properly functioning ecosystem. 
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Moreover, Climate change will likely be responsible for the extinction of a wide array of animal 
species and ecosystems, destroying entities that have intrinsic, instrumental, and aesthetic value. 
 Animal captivity for human amusement- There has recently been a great deal of 
controversy surrounding the ethics of captive animals in circuses, marine amusement parks, and 
zoos. Such behavior is possibly permitted on a Thomistic ethic if done properly. Keeping animals 
captive for amusement is permitted if none of the animal’s basic goods are being frustrated. If an 
animal has access to socialization, a good quality of life, and reproduction, there is nothing 
wrong in a Thomistic sense with keeping animals in captivity. The deprivation of any of these 
goods caused by captivity is prohibited without sufficient reason (it is permissible to sterilize 
captive animals if doing so achieves a common good, i.e. preventing overpopulation, for reasons 
outlined in the previous chapter). 
 Hunting for Sport- In July 2015, the killing of Cecil the lion sparked outrage across the 
West, leading to condemnations from several prominent political figures in Europe and the US. 
The lion was slain by a big game hunter who had been traveling to Zimbabwe to hunt wildlife for 
sport. Our Thomistic ethic is well suited explain such strong sentiments; hunting for sport is not 
permitted on this ethic unless it is for the attainment of the common good (to prevent 
overpopulation, for example). One is not permitted to to end a life or frustrate some intrinsic 
good of an animal without sufficient reason, as was the case with Cecil. The ending of the life of 
a higher-order animals for amusement irrationally frustrates goodness and would be condemned 
on the ethic we have outlined here. 
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Conclusion 
 As we have seen, while Thomas himself advocated some ideas that are antagonistic to the 
environmental project, one need not discard his philosophical system in order to preserve 
environmental responsibility. On the contrary, Thomas’s graded ontology provides the 
groundwork for a theory of value that puts mankind as the penultimate creation while still 
maintaining various degrees of intrinsic value in the animal kingdom. Thomas’s conception of 
the principle of plenitude provides a theological reason for wildlife conservation and emphasizes 
the importance of non-human species, as they themselves are a part of God’s revelation. 
Thomas’s explication of the nature animals and his theory of soul highlights the similarities we 
share with animals in a manner that spurs us toward environmental responsibility. Finally, 
Thomistic virtue ethics can and should be easily extended to the non-human world, such that our 
treatment of animals will instill virtues and foster kindness toward our fellow man. Thus, while 
Thomas may have made troubling remarks about mankind’s relationship to the non-human 
world, these errors are merely indicative of a limited scientific understanding of the animal world 
rather than a fatal error in his philosophical system.  
 To conclude, I shall summarize by concisely summarizing my argument premise by 
premise: 
1. According to Thomas, there exists a graded plurality of beings with each species being similar 
in mode of existence to the species above and below it. 
2. All beings have some degree of intrinsic value by virtue of Thomas’s conception that being 
and goodness are convertible; the degree to which a thing is valued corresponds to the degree to 
which its nature is perfected.  
3. Thomas’s metaphysic necessitates that all beings have their own natural ends and goods. 
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4. Therefore, a Thomistic ethic mandates that we ought to only use animals and the environment 
in accordance with their own ends, being careful not to unduly frustrate any good; the synderesis 
principle mandates that goods are to be strived for and evils are to be avoided. 
5. Environmental virtues are obtained through cultivating habits that achieve relevant goods and 
frustrate evils. 
6. The proper understanding and application of this ethic results in an environmentally and 
zoologically responsible system. 
  In the final analysis, the pillars of Thomistic thought (a perfectionist theory of value, 
Aristotelian metaphysic, virtue-oriented approach to ethics, and a commitment to Christian 
theism) contribute to a robust and compelling environmental ethic, satisfying all of the 
sufficiency conditions set forth in chapter one. Though Thomas himself may not have realized it, 
he provides us a means of seeing the non-human world as rays of divine light, spurring us to 
value the non-human world as God’s creation and our common home. As is written in the Book 
of Wisdom, “For from the greatness and the beauty of created things their original author, by 
analogy, is seen.”  124
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